Pike River Inquiry Phase 3: No training for hydraulic mining

The commission has heard from the men who were running Pike’s hydraulic mining system.

George Mason, photo David Hallett/The Press

George Mason arrived at Pike River mine in August 2010 to take up the job of hydraulic mining co-ordinator. He had never worked in a hydraulic mine before and received no training in it from his new employer, but within two months he was in charge of an operation that was running 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

Mason told the inquiry that Pike boss Peter Whittall and statutory mine manager Doug White were well aware of his lack of experience in the method, which has been used for some years on the West Coast, but is not common in Australia, from where he had moved. He was promised training and the support of expert hydro miners, and was confident he could learn.  But as it turned out there was no formal training in the method, which he found “all very high tech”. He had tried without success to learn about it on the internet, and felt overwhelmed and out of his depth.

The only men around him with hydraulic mining knowledge were contractor Matt Coll, who later pulled back to three days a week, and Masaoki Nishioka, the Japanese hydraulic mining expert who left Pike on October 20 because he feared the mine could blow up at any time. Nishioka gave evidence earlier in the week about how he had spoken to Mason and others of his grave concerns about high methane levels and inadequate ventilation at Pike. But Mason didn’t pass these concerns on to management or others in the hydraulic team. He said he thought Nishioka’s worries would be resolved with the installation of a large new underground fan, and he believed things were “under control.”

Nigel Hampton, lawyer for the Engineers Union, drew a parallel between Mason’s failure to discuss Nishioka’s fears with his superiors and the 1994 disaster at Australia’s Moura 2 mine, where failure to communicate was cited as a key factor in an explosion that killed 11 men. Mason, he revealed, had been an undermanager at Moura 2, and had earlier held the equivalent position at Moura 4, which exploded in 1986 killing 12. Mason surrendered his mining certification and left the industry for 12 years following the 1994 disaster.

Within a month of the trial start-up of Pike’s hydraulic mining system in mid-September 2010, it was ramped up to a 24-hour operation. But there was a chronic lack of experience on the staff. Mason said he believed the ratio of experienced miners to inexperienced – “cleanskins” – should ideally be four to one, but on Pike’s hydraulic team the ratio was almost the opposite. He didn’t report this concern to management, however. “I didn’t need to. Everyone was aware of that.”

Miner Stephen Wylie told the commission that he was thrust into the position of deputy on the hydraulic mining team – a position with statutory responsibilities – without being asked and despite having no background in the method. He received no training; when he asked for it, he was told by Mason – to whom he was answerable – that he couldn’t be spared from the coal face.  Only since last year’s explosion had he set eyes on the training modules prepared by Pike for the hydraulic operation.

Wylie told of a lack of detailed handover between shifts. “It was always hurry, hurry, get your gear and get down the hole.” He also revealed just how poor the production rates were from the hydraulic mining system. While the high-pressure water jet was supposed to carve out huge volumes of coal – and eventually produce 80% of Pike’s output – Wylie likened it to “sandpapering” the coal seam. For example, it took three days to mine one small area that he estimated could have been done in an hour by a conventional mining machine; and in another area the hydraulic team hammered away over the course of 10 shifts to extract what a conventional machine would have done in a shift. The outlook for productivity using the hydraulic system “wasn’t looking real flash,” he told the commission.

Wylie and his crew came off the night shift at 7am on November 19, the day of the first explosion; the men who went in to do the day shift were among the 29 workers who never came out of the mine. Wylie told the commission there were no specific concerns as he spoke to the incoming crew. “There were no unusual smells or sounds. There was no carbon monoxide make in the return roadway. Methane readings were very low.”

• Evidence given earlier in the week by Nishioka that technical services manager Pieter van Rooyen had told him he was too frightened to underground at Pike was refuted yesterday. Lawyer John Haigh told the commission van Rooyen denied making that comment.

Phase 3 hearings have adjourned until December 5.

Click here for all of Rebecca Macfie’s coverage of the Pike River Mine Inquiry.