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Pike River Inquiry Phase two: Mine boss “out of the loop”
| Tags: Pike River coal mine
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Peter Whittall says his hopeful message to families was genuine, but he “didn’t know what he didn’t know”.
Peter Whittall, photo John Kirk-Anderson/The Press
Pike River Coal chief executive Peter Whittall had tried to “share” his optimism that the men had survived the first explosion, and was devastated to learn that family members believed he had given them false hope, he told the final day of hearings for phase two of the inquiry.
He said he had addressed the twice-daily family meetings in the days after the first explosion with the aim of giving true and accurate information, and had conveyed his genuine belief that men may have holed up and waited for rescue. Although all of their training had been to attempt self-escape in an emergency, he believed they may have found an air pocket in the south part of the mine, or built a barricade around a compressed air line using fire-proof brattice available in the mine.
Whittall said that in the course of the commission’s hearings he had learned of vital information he had not known at the time of the disaster. Critically, he had not known that analysis of gas samples showed there was almost certainly a fire underground from the first day. The presence of fire was a central factor in preventing entry by Mines Rescue brigadesmen, and was the source of grave concern among experts at the mine that if the portal was not sealed the mine would explode again.
He said he had subsequently learned that many other people knew of the fire, including the Superintendent Gary Knowles, who attended family meetings with him, and Prime Minister John Key. He had been told by “someone in uniform” at one of the family meetings that: “The Prime Minister doesn’t think you should be using the word heating. He doesn’t see why you’re not using fire … I’ve since understood that briefings were going up through those channels that there was a fire underground. That wasn’t something I was aware of.”
He conceded it was “quite embarrassing … and downright extraordinary that it never got to me” that there had been a fire. He had been “out of the loop,” he said. He had also been unaware of the widespread view among experts at the mine site, such as Mines Rescue general manager Trevor Watts, that the men would almost certainly have perished immediately in the first explosion.
As chief executive of the company, Whittall normally worked in Wellington, although he had lived in Greymouth and been responsible for mine development from 2005 until early 2010. During the crisis he based himself at a Greymouth motel, making visits to the mine site but not forming part of the incident management team. He obtained his information from morning phone briefings from production manager Steve Ellis or statutory mine manager Doug White, and from mine visits.
He said he had also been unaware of the existence of CCTV footage showing the explosion until told of it by Russell Smith, one of the two survivors, on day two. He asked mine manager Doug White for a copy of it and received and viewed it the next day. It was shown to the families the following day. Whittall said he had wanted to show it earlier but was prevented by Knowles on the grounds it would be “too distressing”.
However evidence was read from one family member who recalled Whittall telling a family meeting that he knew of the video but hadn’t viewed it because: “‘I know there’s been an explosion, it’s not going to tell me anything that I do not already know.’”
Whittall replied that he now understood that those at the mine site regarded the footage of the explosion as central to the question of whether any men would have survived. Davidson said the families had expected him to have addressed them on the prospects of rescue having been fully briefed of the facts. Whittall accepted that he had not been so briefed.
Davidson: “Do you accept any responsibility at all for that fact?”
Whittall: “You’ve put a question to me which is almost impossible to answer. I feel devastated that the families looked to me for information and that I didn’t provide it. Do I feel personally like I’ve let them down? I think the whole process has let them down in not knowing the answers to questions that they should have known. Do I feel that by my own omission that I did not have information, no I don’t … I didn’t know what I didn’t know.”
Commissioner Steward Bell asked Whittall why, given the range of experts working on the operation at the mine site, he had not thought of speaking to people such as Watts and New South Wales mines rescue expert Seamus Devlin, “rather than taking information just from one source”.
Whittall replied that as chief executive he was conscious of his roles, one of which was to manage communications. He was also conscious of demarcation lines within the rescue operation, and the risk of usurping the authority of the incident controller (Superintendent Gary Knowles). However, in hindsight, “I do greatly regret that I didn’t take a more active, or have the ability to take a more active role up there.”
On the highly charged matter of the disastrous family meeting on day five, when news of the second explosion was delivered, Whittall broke down and wept as he explained his perspective. Having decided beforehand in discussion with Knowles that he should break the bad news, he had then felt nauseous and didn’t know what to say to the room full of 500 family members, and had been overwhelmed and intimidated.
He said his style of communication was to take three steps back and then bring the listener up to the present moment, and this is what he had begun to do when he opened the meeting by saying he had just been up at the mine and Mines Rescue were getting ready to go in. When the people immediately began cheering he realised the subtlety of his communication style had been lost on them.
“I don’t know how I could’ve said it differently, but gosh, there must be a 1000 ways of delivering that message that would’ve been more effective than that.”
• Phase three of the inquiry begins in November.