Pike River Inquiry Phase two: no window for rescuers

The decision not to send rescuers into the mine following the Pike explosion was correct, the Inquiry has heard.

Fire coming from the vent shaft of the Pike River mine

There was no “window of opportunity” for rescuers to dash up the 2.3 km tunnel into the Pike River mine to rescue the 29 workers after the explosion on November 19, a mine gas specialist told the commission.

At the height of the emergency there was repeated talk of such a “window” in the aftermath of an explosion when explosive gases had been burned off, and frustration that a rescue attempt was not made. But the commission heard this week that there was always a high risk of another explosion, and mine experts were impeded in gathering enough reliable information to confirm that it was safe for rescuers to enter. The mine’s ventilation and gas monitoring systems had been destroyed in the first blast, and the only other place where gas samples could be taken was at the top of the ventilation shaft, on the bush-clad ridge above the mine.

With no ventilation system flushing away gases, and with no ability to take representative samples from different parts of the mine, it was impossible to interpret the safety of the atmosphere underground. “The opportunity to re-enter [the mine] did not exist,” said Darren Brady, of Queensland’s Safety in Mines Testing and Research Station (SIMTARs), who had arrived at the scene the morning after the explosion.

Brady listed instances of underground coal mine disasters where subsequent explosions had occurred within minutes or hours of the initial blast. In Western Siberia last year many rescuers sent in to an exploded mine were killed in a second blast three-and-a-half hours after the first. At a mine in Utah in 2000, three further explosions occurred within half an hour of the first.

Although there has been reference to a possible re-entry by rescuers on day five after the initial explosion at Pike, experts at the site had ruled that out. Seamus Devlin, state manager of the New South Wales Mine Rescue Service – who had arrived late on day one of the operation – said there was evidence of combustion underground and it could not be confirmed that atmospheric conditions were within acceptable limits. It was at 2.37pm that day that the second explosion occurred.

This was the afternoon of the disastrous family meeting at which Pike chief executive Peter Whittall inexplicably began by saying rescuers had been preparing to go in, prompting still-hopeful relatives to burst into applause. The families were then delivered the terrible news that there had been a second blast, and that all hope of finding survivors was lost.

Superintendent Gary Knowles, who has been vilified by family members for his manner during the operation, gave an emotional account of the meeting to the commission and apologised for the way the news was delivered. Bernie Monk, spokesman for the families, later publicly acknowledged and thanked Knowles for his apology.

The commission has this week also heard further evidence of a disconnect between the hopeful message being given to families in the first days of the operation, and what was going on behind the scenes. Devlin revealed that he and New Zealand Mines Rescue Service manager Trevor Watts were asked by police on day four after the first explosion if they would prepare a document indicating that the miners were dead. Although Devlin did, indeed, believe the men would have perished in the initial blast, he refused to comply with the request, saying it was outside his scope.

Both Brady and Devlin told the commission of their surprise to arrive in New Zealand to find the police in charge of the mine rescue. They described unwieldy incident management meetings at the mine site, where valuable time had to be spent explaining technical mining terms to non-expert members.

There has also been repeated reference to the enormous frustration caused by the requirement to send risk assessments on planned actions to the incident controller (Knowles) in Greymouth, and then up to Wellington, where they were pored over by a bevy of bureaucrats before final decisions were made by the response co-ordinator, assistant commissioner Grant Nicholls.

On one occasion, approval to drill a borehole – required for gas sampling – was held up for hours. The drillers were due to start at first light on day three of the operation, and by that afternoon they were still waiting for approval to begin. An earlier witness has told the commission that the manager of the drilling company threatened to stop work over the Department of Labour’s insistence that the risk assessment be regarded as a “static” document, which denied the drillers the opportunity to respond to changing circumstances.

Brady told of once seeing a request to explain what the latest gas results meant so that they could be understood by someone off-site who didn’t understand gas analysis, but who was involved in the decision-making process. “I found it difficult to understand why that person would be making decisions based on gas interpretation if they did not have an understanding.”

The police have also come under attack for failing to plan for “parallel contingencies”. They relied heavily on Whittall’s belief that the men could have survived the first blast, and it was not until day four that Nicholls began gathering expert advice on the survivability of the conditions underground. They also failed to make parallel preparations to seal the mine quickly, in the event that it was decided this was the best course.

Evidence heard by the commission suggests that the need to maintain a public impression of hope may have been partially responsible for this. Brady referred to a meeting at Greymouth police station on day four, when he and Pike mine manager Doug White discussed the requirement for the Queensland government’s GAG machine, in case it was decided that the mine needed to be sealed and made inert to prevent further explosions.

The pair was told the GAG was not wanted. Brady – who himself did not favour sealing the mine prior to the second explosion – recalls being told: “We don’t want it in the car park.”  He said he gained the impression that the presence of the GAG would send a “message that we were going from a rescue to a recovery.”

*Phase two of the commission hearings, which is focusing on the search and rescue operation, continues next week.